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“Regulation of the Railway Industry”
Across the world, railways are poised to face new challenges, as all 
transport modes are transformed by technological innovations, 
liberalisation, competition with other modes of transport and most 
recently by digitalisation. Consequently, the railway industry is 
required to increase efficiency while ensuring security and safety, as it 
has to address multimodality, such as buses, as well as compete with 
new transport modes, such as car-sharing. Regulation of the railway 
industry and its various dimensions, not the least competition, is 
central factor in the process of its transformation and will ultimately 
decide whether railways will or will not increase their modal share.
This issue of the Network Industries Quarterly (NIQ) is dedicated to 
some of the best papers presented at the Florence Conference on the 
Regulation of Railways, which took place on November 16 and 17, 
2018. Selected academics and practitioners were invited to Florence 
to discuss the latest developments in the field of railway regulation, 
such as competition in the market, role of regulatory agencies and 
economic perspectives.
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Access conditions for rolling stock leasing in Spain*
Ciara Vicente Mampel**
The offer of locomotives available in the lease market of rolling stock in Spain is basically reduced to the one that the state-owned rolling stock 
operating company can make available to third parties. This paper assesses the content of lease agreements concluded by said company in compliance 
with the sectoral legislation.
1. Addressing the issue
The specificities of the railway sector remain an ob-stacle to free competition among real or potential operators that are prevented from competitive 
access to the market for transport services due to the exist-
ence of barriers to the entrance. In Spain, one such obstacle 
is the access to rolling stock, in particular to locomotives. 
This was reiterated by the Spain’s National Commission 
for Markets and Competition (known by its Spanish acro-
nym, CNMC) in a Decision of 23 May 2018 on the access 
conditions to rolling stock of Renfe Alquiler de Material 
Ferroviario S.A. (hereinafter, Renfe Alquiler), which will be 
analysed below.
Several reasons substantiate the statement of the regula-
tory body. The high cost of acquiring the rolling stock and 
the long deadlines for its manufacture and authorisation 
for placing it in service, as well as the existence of technical 
differences to the European rail network (track gauge and 
signalling and traffic control systems), make it quite diffi-
cult to manufacture a rolling stock to be used across fron-
tiers. This is why the rental is naturally the most beneficial 
alternative with which to acquire rolling stock in property. 
Nevertheless, the market for rolling stock leasing is not 
widespread in Spain. Unlike other European countries, 
there are only two companies engaged in the purchase of 
railway rolling stock for its subsequent leasing. One is Al-
pha Trains Iberia S.L., which has its locomotive fleet leased 
as a whole. The other is Renfe Alquiler, which is a state-
owned rolling stock operating company (ROSCO) set up 
in 2014 and owned by the incumbent Renfe-Operadora.
The Spanish railway market was traditionally character-
ised by a vertically integrated public monopoly, whereby 
the State was responsible for the management of the in-
frastructure and the provision of transport services. Both 
activities were entrusted to Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles 
Españoles (Renfe) (Fernández Acevedo 2014). Nevertheless, 
in order to meet the European requirements, the restruc-
turing of the traditional market took place by detaching 
the activities of administration of railway infrastructure, 
which constitutes a natural monopoly, from the exploita-
tion of the transport services, which are progressively open 
to competition (Cuerdo Mir 2007, Bermejo Vera 2014). 
On one hand, the construction, management and admin-
istration activities of the infrastructure were entrusted in-
itially to Renfe and later Administrador de Infraestructuras 
Ferroviarias (Adif) (Carbonell Porras 2007). On the other 
hand, Spanish State created Renfe-Operadora for the provi-
sion of passenger and freight rail transport services, which 
integrated in its assets all the movable and immovable 
property of the former monopoly (Rams Ramos 2007). 
The commercial activity of Renfe-Operadora is now divided 
into four lines of activity (passengers, cargo and logistics, 
manufacture and maintenance, and asset management) by 
means of four commercial companies fully owned by the 
State. These are Renfe Viajeros, S.A., Renfe Mercancías, S.A., 
Renfe Fabricación y Mantenimiento, S.A. and Renfe Alquil-
er de Material Ferroviario, S.A. (Renfe 2013) (Figure 1). 
Therefore, despite having a large fleet of rolling stock, this 
company did not develop the lease until 29 April 2014 
with the start-up of its subsidiary Renfe Alquiler, which, 
as has already been pointed out, is the quasi-monopolistic 
provider of rental services for rolling stock nowadays. 
Given that the meaningful market power of the incum-
bent and its link with the ROSCO might bring about an-
ticompetitive behaviours intended to hamper the proper 
functioning of the railway sector, the Spanish legislator 
envisaged an ex-ante regulatory framework of obligations 
that imposed certain conditions in the rental services of the 
latter. It is said that the imposition of ex-ante obligations 
is appropriate during a transition period for the complete 
liberalisation of economic sectors; mostly ‘where former 
monopoly operators continue to benefit from inherited market 
power or where firms are vertically integrated’ (Slot P.J., and 
Skudder A. 2001). Thus, Renfe Alquiler has a legal obliga-
tion to provide access to rolling stock that it owns to third 
* The present study has been carried out in the framework of the research project ‘Ventajas y riesgos de la competencia en el sector del transporte’ (Ref. 
UJI-B2016-14), financed by Universitat Jaume I, Castellón de la Plana (Spain) (main researcher: M.V. Petit-Lavall).
** Predoctoral Researcher, Institute for Transport Law (IDT), Universitat Jaume I de Castelló, Spain, vicentec@uji.es
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parties under objective, transparent and non-discrimina-
tory conditions pursuant to the 16th Additional Provision 
of the Railways Act no. 38/2015, of 29 September, which 
extensively refers to the obligation of Renfe-Operadora to 
ensure the independence of the board members of its sub-
sidiary from the transport operators who demanded the 
rental services of railway rolling stock, whether public or 
private. Thus, it is expressly prohibited for Renfe Alquiler to 
carry out activities that could impede access to the rolling 
stock that it owns by means of the establishment of access 
conditions that are not acceptable to railway undertakings 
(such as undue economic conditions) or that only enable 
them to access it under unfavourable conditions (such 
as a limited or delayed availability of rolling stock or the 
availability of older and, therefore, less competitive rolling 
stock).
It is specifically here, in the realm of providing access to 
rolling stock of Renfe Alquiler on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis, that the aim of this paper is focused. The following 
pages offer an assessment of the legal basis and content of 
the leasing contracts concluded by such a state commer-
cial company to make its rolling stock available to third 
parties. According to the aforementioned decision of the 
CNMC, this particularly concerns what contractual con-
ditions contained therein are inappropriate to this kind of 
lease because they increase the costs of leasing rolling stock 
and can affect the competitiveness of railway undertakings 
in the provision of rail transport services.
2. Lease agreements of rolling stock of Renfe Alquiler
A. Common structure
The main activity of Renfe Alquiler consists of carrying 
out leasing operations for the provision of the railway roll-
ing stock that it owns, and its facilities, as well as, when ap-
propriate, the management of rolling stock that belongs to 
third parties. Under a lease agreement, one of the signing 
parties, called the lessor, is obliged to assign the full enjoy-
ment of services of goods to a third party, called the user 
or lessee, for a specific period of time in return for regular 
expressly agreed-upon rental payments (Serra Rodríguez, 
2016a). This legal business could be considered as renting 
(the lessor transfers the use of the good to a third party 
in exchange for a certain rent during the period of time 
agreed, without a purchase option, including the provision 
of additional services, among which is the maintenance of 
the good leased) or operational leasing (the manufacturer 
of the equipment directly cedes its use to the manufac-
turer’s client, which acquires it in exchange for a periodic 
canon agreed). However, from a legal perspective, none of 
them do go beyond the structure or purpose of the typical 
lease contract, the content of which shall be substantially 
ruled by the general provisions of the Spanish Civil Code 
(hereinafter, CC), for everything that was not expressly 
agreed to by the contracting parties (Morillas Jarillo 1993; 
Cámara Lapuente 2008, Moreno Serrano 2017, Mercurio 
and Moschera 2011). Accordingly, all the lease agreements 
concluded by Renfe Alquiler are generally based on the fol-
lowing common structure.
It is a legal business that has bilateral character. Therefore, 
the contractual relationship arises between Renfe Alquiler 
(the lessor) that takes on the main provision of giving the 
exclusive use and enjoyment of the locomotives during an 
expressly agreed upon period, and a third party (the user or 
lessee) that acquires the use and enjoyment of locomotives 
transferred for their industrial or commercial exploitation, 
but not the property, in exchange for a price consisting in 
the regular payment of fees. However, besides the transfer 
Figure 1. The restructuring of the Spanish rail sector 
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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of the use of locomotives, the leasing contracts between 
Renfe Alquiler and its customers necessarily include the 
comprehensive maintenance of those (both preventive 
and, partially, corrective) to ensure the peaceful enjoyment 
of them. The comprehensive maintenance contract will be 
concluded by Renfe Alquiler with a single maintenance en-
tity.
Accordingly, the lessee will mostly be obliged to affect 
the locomotives to their industrial or commercial exploita-
tion and to pay the price to the lessor, as agreed (Sánchez 
Hernández 2016b). It is a periodic payment, usually 
monthly, which will depend on the type of locomotive 
leased, in accordance with the commercial offer of Renfe 
Alquiler. More specifically, this monthly rent will be the to-
tal amount of two elements. The first is a fixed fee for each 
vehicle leased that will depend on the type of locomotive 
that is subject to the contract, the number of those and the 
lease period. The second is a variable fee that is determined 
based on the price per kilometre driven for each vehicle 
leased. That obligation shall be fulfilled if the lessor carries 
out its own obligations (Sánchez Hernández 2016a). Espe-
cially, that Renfe Alquiler delivers the leased tractor rolling 
stock in the place and according to the previously agreed 
conditions (Article 1554.1 CC) having the lessee the right 
to review the state in which it is supplied. Moreover, unless 
otherwise agreed, Renfe Alquiler is obliged to make all the 
necessary repairs for the peaceful enjoyment of the leased 
locomotive if it is not attributable to the acts of the lessee 
(Sánchez Hernández 2016a).
Nevertheless, against the lessor, the user is obliged to re-
ceive the leased locomotive, to use it in accordance with 
its nature and to preserve it in the state in which it was 
received according to the expressly agreed upon use or ac-
cording to commercial uses or usage (Article 1555.2 CC). 
This obligation is not met with the loss or deterioration 
of the leased locomotive (Sánchez Hernández 2016b). On 
the whole, the lessees assume the risk for loss or deterio-
ration of the locomotive leased, whether it is not proven 
that they acted with all the due diligence to avoid caus-
ing a harmful event or, at least, that they have taken the 
necessary measures of care and vigilance to avoid causing 
the harmful event. The Spanish Supreme Court consid-
ers it to be a rebuttable presumption of responsibility for 
the deterioration or loss of the leased asset, which operates 
against the lessee, which has the obligation to prove that it 
acted with all due diligence to avoid the production of the 
harmful event, not being enough to prove that the leased 
asset was used as agreed – Judgment no. 70/2016, of 17 
February (RJ 2016, 545) reiterating the Supreme Court 
doctrine, e.g., in its Judgments no.1097/2006, of 24 Octo-
ber (RJ 2006, 671) and no. 134/2001, of 12 February (RJ 
2001, 850). In this case, there is a distribution of respon-
sibilities and risks between Renfe Alquiler and the lessees in 
the event of defects, breakdowns and damages in the loco-
motives. However, the latter must conclude, in any case, 
a fully comprehensive coverage of locomotive risks prior 
to its reception, civil liability insurance and a guarantee 
in case of breaching its contractual obligations. The lease 
contracts define the availability and reliability index of the 
locomotives that the lessor agrees to comply with, together 
with the penalties that the latter will assume against the 
lessee in case of non-compliance. These availability index-
es, which depend on the technical characteristics and age 
of each vehicle, will allow the operator to know the days 
on which the locomotives will be subject to a preventive 
maintenance intervention, detailing the duration of these 
in the contracts as well as other additional causes that are 
described and that they will be, in any case, the responsi-
bility of Renfe Alquiler.
Furthermore, the lease agreements include a wide range 
of assumptions on which both Renfe Alquiler and the lessee 
railway undertaking can terminate the contract with the 
corresponding compensation for damages, as well as the 
cases in which the parties must pay penalties for non-com-
pliance (for example, by early termination of the contract 
without due cause or breach thereof ). These penal clauses 
fulfil a double function. One function is a guarantee of 
compliance with the main obligation, since the penalty 
compels the debtor to perform the due service. The other is 
the indemnity function of the damages that may have pro-
duced the breach or defective fulfillment of the main ob-
ligation – Judgment of the Supreme Court no. 197/2016, 
of 30 March (RJ 2016, 1153) with reference to its own 
settled case law, e.g., Judgments of the Supreme Court no. 
586/2013, of 8 October (RJ 2013, 7802); no. 93/2012, of 
21 February (RJ 2012, 4524); no. 930/2006, of 28 Sep-
tember (RJ 2006, 6390). Hence, besides reproducing the 
general decisional regime of mutual obligations, pursuant 
to the breach of one party empowers the other to choose 
between claiming the performance of the obligation or to 
urge the termination of the contract (Art. 1124 CC), penal 
clauses for non-compliance with the main obligation have 
also been agreed upon, by which the debtor of the benefit 
that is to be guaranteed (lessor or lessee) is obliged to pay a 
certain amount of money, as agreed.
Finally, the lessee is empowered to sub-lease the locomo-
tive transferred by entering into a new lease contract with 
a third party provided that it has the prior consent of Renfe 
Alquiler. Once the term of the lease stipulated in the con-
tract has elapsed, the lessee must return the locomotives 
to Renfe Alquiler in the same state in which they were re-
ceived, presuming that the lessee receives the leased asset 
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in good condition, unless otherwise agreed or proven (Ar-
ticles 1561 and 1652 CC) (Cámara Lapuente, 2008). The 
locomotives whose lease contracts expire and are therefore 
returned to Renfe Alquiler could be again offered in lease to 
all railway undertakings.
B. Clauses that can restrict the access to Renfe’s loco-
motives
A question that needs to be addressed is which of these 
contractual conditions can, according to the aforemen-
tioned decision of the CNMC, restrict the access to Renfe’s 
locomotives in an objective, transparent and non-discrim-
inatory conditions, as envisaged in Spanish law. Essential-
ly, the regulatory body focuses on the provision of main-
tenance services, especially the choice of a company in 
charge of them, on the economic conditions applied and 
on other relevant clauses to access to locomotives such as 
penalty or damage insurance clauses.
As pointed out above, Renfe Alquiler is responsible for 
choosing the maintenance entity and the approved centre, 
both of which are charged with full maintenance of the 
locomotives in accordance with the law in force. Because 
of this, the incentives of the lessor and the lessee in the 
maintenance and conservation of the rolling stock are not 
aligned mostly in those leases that are of a shorter dura-
tion. Renfe Alquiler, as owner of the locomotives, looks af-
ter conserving them in running order so as to extend their 
economic life as much as possible. On the contrary, lessees 
will be willing to maximise their use at the lowest pos-
sible cost. Renfe Alquiler has concluded a comprehensive 
maintenance contract of all its locomotive fleet with an 
undertaking integrated in its own business group: Renfe 
Fabricación y Mantenimiento. Renfe Fabricación y Manten-
imiento is also a state-owned company that is fully owned 
by Renfe-Operadora, which is entrusted with the provision 
of manufacturing services. This maintenance entity meets 
all the legal requirements to operate maintenance servic-
es and also has the necessary know-how to guarantee the 
proper conservation of the locomotives because it has tra-
ditionally been providing these services. Nonetheless, the 
regulatory body claims that not all of these circumstances 
are enough to justify this choice, given the conflicts of in-
terests effectively posed by vertically integrated structures. 
This is not only because of the link between the lessor (Ren-
fe Alquiler) and the company in charge of the maintenance 
of locomotives, but also because of the integration of these 
companies into a holding company (Renfe-Operadora) that 
also controls railway undertakings (Renfe Mercancías and 
Renfe Viajeros) (Figure 2).
The two facts highlighted above pose negative elements, 
especially for lessees. On one hand, there is a lack of trans-
parency in the conditions of the provision of maintenance 
services arising from not contracting such services under 
competitive conditions in the market. On the other hand, 
Renfe Fabricación y Mantenimiento is currently responsible 
for executing maintenance services in locomotives owned 
not only by Renfe Alquiler but also by Renfe Viajeros and 
Renfe Mercancías. This is why the regulatory body has re-
quired Renfe Alquiler to band the locomotives in batches 
and submit the maintenance services of each of them to 
competitive agreements, through a tender procedure that 
is open to any entity under the administrative principles of 
equity, transparency and non-discrimination.
As far as the economic conditions of the agreements are 
concerned, the commercial offer of Renfe Alquiler is not 
discriminatory against any lessees, beyond the existing 
differences on the variable fee, which will depend on the 
number of kilometres driven for each vehicle leased. How-
ever, the CNMC points out that the monthly rent that the 
lessees must pay to Renfe Alquiler is not objective depend-
ing on the type of the locomotive leased. The prices for 
the rental services of the most modern Renfe’s locomotives, 
which are the most competitive ones, are similar to those 
set in the market by its competitors. However, the prices 
for the oldest ones, which do not face any competition 
in the market, are disproportionate to their residual value. 
This is why Renfe Alquiler has been urged to justify why 
the fixed rental fee that the lessees must satisfy is based on 
objective parameters (such as technical characteristics, cost 
of maintenance services, residual value or expected profit-
ability of the asset).
Other essential issues that have been discussed are the 
penalties for early termination of the contract without 
Figure 2. The structure of the model discussed
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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due cause or breach thereof, and the fully comprehensive 
coverage of the risks that affect the locomotive. The lease 
agreement includes penal clauses that dissuade both the 
lessor and the lessee from breaching their contractual 
obligations by paying a pecuniary amount, as agreed. 
One of these penalty clauses states that the lessee must 
pay to the lessor if there is an early termination of the 
agreements by the lessee without just cause or by Renfe 
Alquiler due to the breach of the lessee. This penalty 
is not applied vice versa (that is, if Renfe Alquiler is the 
party that breaches the agreement or ends it in advance 
and without just cause). In this case, the regulatory body 
has considered that this contractual term is unfair since 
it entails a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising from the lease contract. This situation is 
again due to the conflicts of interest posed by the vertically 
integrated structures in compliance with the obligation 
of the ROSCO to provide access to locomotives on a 
non-discriminatory basis. In particular, this is because 
this undertaking can involve incentives to terminate 
the lease contracts without just cause, with the aim of 
favouring the railway undertakings integrated in its group 
to the detriment of its competitors in the market. Thus, 
it is requested that all lease agreements also incorporate a 
penalty clause for breach or early termination of the lessor 
in the same way as they do for the lessees, so that there is 
a symmetry in the penalties that may correspond to both 
contracting parties.
The damage insurance clause, for its part, has been de-
scribed as disproportionate because the total amount of 
the insurance required is very high compared to the re-
sidual value of the locomotives, thus entailing an unjus-
tified increase in the costs that the railway undertakings 
must bear. This clause is discriminatory as well because it 
does not apply to the lease agreements concluded between 
Renfe Alquiler and the railways undertakings integrated in 
its group. On the contrary, these contracts include clauses 
that set the amount that lessees must pay in case of loss or 
destruction of locomotives, which is not as high as that of 
the mandatory damage insurance for the rest of the alter-
native railway undertakings. The fact that the independ-
ence of the board members of Renfe Alquiler is granted by 
Renfe-Operadora should assume that Renfe Alquiler behaves 
independently from the policy of its group, treating all the 
lease undertakings equally. Therefore, the obligation to 
conclude a damage insurance should be required from any 
lessees in a similar way to avoid any possible preferential 
treatments.
3. Closing remarks
As claimed by the Spanish regulatory body, Renfe Alquil-
er has set specific contractual conditions of access to its 
railway rolling stock, which are economically unaffordable 
to potential railway undertakings or, at least, which gives 
them unrestricted access to it compared other undertak-
ings integrated in its group, closing the competitiveness of 
those in the market for rail transport services.
Fulfilling all of the requirements addressed by the CNMC 
will ensure the enforcement of contractual terms that are 
equally favourable for all the lessee railway undertakings 
to reduce the well-known conflicts of interest posed by the 
vertical integration of Renfe Alquiler in a holding company 
(Renfe-Operadora) that simultaneously controls the entity 
responsible for the provision of the maintenance services of 
the leased locomotives (Renfe Fabricación y Mantenimein-
to) and the largest railway companies in Spain (Renfe Mer-
cancías and Renfe Viajeros). This is because the structural 
separation of Renfe Alquiler and Renfe-Operadora does not 
prevent Renfe-Operadora, as the owner of the rental servic-
es provider company, from carrying out behaviours aimed 
at hindering the entry of potential newcomers. Thus, the 
principle of party autonomy on which the whole private 
legal relationship is based has been slightly restricted in 
compliance with the obligation of Renfe Alquiler to provide 
access to railway rolling stock on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis. However, the situation in other European countries 
should be taken into account as well. An example is the 
British ROSCOs, privately owned rolling stock operating 
companies that have been disassociated from the incum-
bent.
Be that as it may, this is just the beginning of a new 
competitive controversy that is particularly raised at the 
Spanish railway sector. The 16th additional provision has 
remained in the last amendment of the of the Railways Act 
no. 38/2015, following the Royal decree-law no. 23/2018, 
of 21 December, which transposes into Spanish law the 
Directive (EU) 2016/2370 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 December 2016 amending Di-
rective 2012/34/EU regarding the opening of the market 
for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the 
governance of the railway infrastructure. The new provi-
sion adds a new paragraph stating that the conditions of 
leasing rolling stock services of Renfe Alquiler to alternative 
railway undertakings shall have to be established in the 
regulations. Thus, the conclusions reached by the CNMC 
should at least be born in mind for a further regulatory 
development.
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PTA Design and Rail Transport Quality
Daniel S. Herfurth*
The more centralised the design of a PTA within the federal states is, the better the rail transport quality. This is the brief result of a cross-sectional 
analysis of the full population of the 28 PTAs in charge of short-distance rail services in Germany.
I. Introduction
Public transport authorities (PTAs) play a key role in the transformation process from traditional in-tramodally segregated transportation realms into 
intermodal mobility services. They have the capacity and 
the legitimacy to serve as the neutral platform and steering 
authority required by any integration process of fragment-
ed public mobility providers. In modern terms, a PTA can 
be the administrative counterpart of the often proclaimed 
‘Mobility as a Service’ (Hietanen 2014) model.
Before politicians start to award PTAs new competencies 
with regard to future mobility, we should examine how 
well they are doing with their current obligations. Let us 
start with PTAs in charge of short-distance passenger rail 
services. The evaluation contains two major obstacles. The 
first is how to compare existing PTA designs across Eu-
rope without being confronted with incomparable nation-
al contexts. Second, what is actually to be measured and 
what is ‘rail transport quality’?
Section II addresses the first question and delivers the re-
sults of a study conducted in Germany. Due to its federal-
ism, Germany offers a variety of institutional designs, also 
with regard to PTAs. Those PTAs represent a pool from 
which cross-case analyses within the same national con-
text are possible. Section III addresses the second question 
and reports the measurement procedure applied in the 
above-mentioned study. It builds on DIN EN 13816 and 
develops it for the realm of railways. Section IV provides 
an overview of the design of the study, after which Section 
V discusses the data sources and results. The study is meant 
as a policy evaluation of the different institutional settings 
of PTAs in Germany. Although it only covers the situation 
in short-distance services in one country, the mechanism 
behind it is of general interest for both other countries and 
other divisions of rail transport. Since all EU member states 
have to open their markets for short distance rail services, 
pursuant to the 4th European Railway Package, best-prac-
tice knowledge of key variables for successful PTAs will be 
valuable. Other divisions of rail transport can be provided 
similar benefits; particularly when tendering models for 
long-distance passenger services, open freight services or 
infrastructure maintenance come on the agenda. The dis-
cussion of the results is to be found in Section VI.
II. PTA Design
The structure of PTAs in Germany is very heterogeneous, 
so the present study focuses on Public rail transport au-
thorities (PRTAs) in particular. After the country’s major 
Railway Reform in 1994, the federal states were given the 
competency to plan and fund the services in the realm of 
short-distance passenger rail transport. All PRTAs installed 
since have been genuinely new, because no explicit PRTA 
had been needed for this kind of rail services before the 
reform – the former German Federal Railways just pro-
vided the service on behalf of the federal administration 
(Grandjot & Bernecker 2014).
The legislation process left a lot of leeway for the federal 
states in terms of how to fulfil their new competency for 
short-distance passenger rail transport (Wachinger & Wit-
temann 1996). The German Constitution just assigns the 
federal states the competency (Art. 143a III GG) and the 
accompanying federal law is only as precise as to prescribe 
the states to name ‘institutions’ that manage this compe-
tency (§ 1 II RegG).
Consequently, the federal states have followed their own 
ideas of what a ‘good’ PRTA should look like (Eckstaller 
2001). The PRTAs were created between 1994 and 1996 
and then set into force in the context of the ‘regionalisa-
tion’ that is still in place, with minor modifications of the 
PRTAs in some states only. The design of those PRTAs 
differs in three dimensions: (1) the degree of autonomy of 
the PRTA from their state, (2) the degree of centralisation, 
and (3) the scope of tasks of the PRTA.
The first dimension (degree of autonomy) arises from the 
fact that some states decided to take on responsibility for 
rail planning on their own, without creating a new insti-
tution. Others, however, decided to form a separate insti-
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tution and – again a sub-differentiation – equipped them 
with different degrees of autonomy, either as a dependent 
body or as an institution that is largely allowed to make 
decisions on its own. The latter clearly comes closest to the 
ideal type of an ‘agency’ in the sense of Giandomenico Ma-
jone (1999), while the former represents the ideal type of 
core administrative action. The dependent body represents 
the intermediate solution.
The second dimension (degree of centralisation) addresses 
the phenomenon that some states founded more than one 
PRTA for their territory. In those cases, the composition of 
the managing board can vary substantially – starting with 
models where only the state has a say in the PRTA and 
ending with a system where the counties and the commu-
nities also have decision making power.
The third dimension (scope of tasks) reflects the fact that 
some PRTA are not only in charge of short-distance rail 
services, but also in charge of other branches of public 
transport. The latter competency had already been with 
the states before the ‘regionalisation’ was set into force. 
Some states then decided to merge both competencies in a 
single institution in 1996, but others did not.
Currently, 28 PRTAs have been established in Germany, 
all shaped differently on each of the three dimensions (Fig-
ure 1). Although they were founded on the basis of con-
jectures (since no best practice was available at that time), 
they never had to give proof of their performance (Aberle 
2004). Differences in terms of performance are either ne-
gated ex ante (Wewers 2004) or claimed to be ignorable 
due to a general increase in quality (Holzhey et al. 2014). 
The present study steps into this gap and examines the per-
formance of the PRTAs on a cross-sectional basis.
Unlike other studies (for an overview, see Finger 2014), 
the present study not only measures performance – which 
is hard enough, as will be shown in Section III – but also 
regresses performance on the three above-mentioned di-
mensions of institutional design.
III. Rail Transport Quality
The ‘quality’ of a service is a latent construct that has 
many pitfalls when trying to measure it. On the one hand, 
some aspects of quality are accompanied by a highly sub-
jective overtone. On the other hand, the quality of rail 
transport depends on the viewpoint of different stakehold-
ers involved in this business. 
First, I address the viewpoint issue. The PRTA is the ‘ad-
vocate’ of the citizens as passengers of and taxpayers for 
public transport (Schnieder 2015). It should be in the PR-
TA’s interest to plan its services with regard to the passen-
gers’ needs and to fund the services with regard to the tax-
payers’ bearing capacity. The other actors involved in the 
rail business – mainly train operators, infrastructure man-
agers and train manufacturers – are not politically related 
but, if at all, contractually related to the PRTA. They settle 
service and purchase contracts and in case of any dispute, 
private law is usually applied. With respect to passengers, 
however, the PRTA is politically accountable, although 
it is legitimated only very indirectly (usually via the ap-
pointment of managers through a political actor, such as 
the transport minister of the state). It is important to note 
that parameters of the demand or ‘success’ side, such as 
the ‘modal split’ or the ‘number of passengers carried’ are 
not to be taken into consideration for a definition of ser-
vice quality here. Doing so would be misleading because 
legislation only assigns the states the duty to implement a 
supply of rail transport, and does not, of course, assign the 
citizens the duty to use it.
Second, ‘quality’ must be defined from the viewpoint of 
the passenger and the taxpayer. DIN EN 13816 provides 
some criteria that give hints for how to measure quality of 
public transport from this viewpoint: accessibility, avail-
ability, punctuality, consumption of resources, comfort, 
service and information are listed there (Richter 2014). 
The former four of these seven criteria are quite manifest 
in themselves. The present study suggests employing the 
variables ‘train kilometres’ (Y1) and ‘train stops’ (Y2) in 
Figure 1. Territories of the German PRTA
Source: Author’s own compilation (based on BAG 2018)
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order to measure accessibility and availability. ‘Punctuality’ 
can be directly used as a variable (Y3). Variables Y1 to Y3 
are of particular interest for citizens as passengers. Howev-
er, ‘consumption of resources’ is rather affiliated with the 
citizens’ viewpoint as a taxpayer and is represented by ‘need 
of subsidy per km’ (Y5). 
The latter three of those seven criteria (comfort, service, 
information) touch on a rather subjective matter. This 
problem can be solved when attention is directed not so 
much to the results that PRTAs achieve content-wise in 
any of these criteria. Instead, attention is paid only to the 
number of criteria that PRTAs consider in order to meas-
ure comfort, service and information. Therefore, this study 
looks at the meta-level and ‘counts’ indicators that the PR-
TAs apply in order to measure quality from the perspective 
of the passengers. To achieve this aim, a quality score (Y4) 
is constructed that simply counts the criteria of the PRTA. 
Additionally, the score counts the number of ‘styles’ they 
use to gather information (such as relying on self-reports 
of the train operators, employing own evaluation staff and 
others). Last, it values the accuracy of information that 
PRTAs seek to have for their own quality reports (net-
work-wide, per train category, per train line or per each 
single train; see Klein 2007). 
Finally, the requirement of comprehensive ‘information’ 
includes not only information about the journey, but also 
information on a meta-level regarding the performance of 
a PRTA. As a public entity using taxpayers’ contributions, 
PRTAs must record their work and present it to the public. 
This rule is fixed at the European level via EU Regulation 
1370/2007. Nevertheless, the levels of documentation vary 
a lot among PRTAs, so ‘documentation’ is introduced as a 
variable (Y6) in order to satisfy the right of the taxpayer to 
transparency of public action.
These six variables (Y1 to Y6) serve as performance indi-
cators in order to measure rail transport quality from the 
viewpoint of the citizen and in the realm of responsibility 
of the PRTA. The six variables are designed in such a way 
that they are in the sole responsibility of the PRTA. For 
‘train kilometres’, ‘train stops’, ‘quality score’ and ‘docu-
mentation’, this is clear from the nature of the variable. 
However, it is not so clear for ‘punctuality’ and ‘subsidy per 
km’. The infrastructure manager influences both criteria, 
too, through making operational decisions on which train 
to prioritise in case of congestion and through imposing 
fixed infrastructure fees that increase the need for a sub-
sidy. To assign ‘punctuality’ to the PRTA only, the study 
emphasises the bargaining power of the PRTA. It is the 
PRTA’s choice to avoid contracts that offer untrustworthy 
timetable calculations and to demand additional standby 
trains in order to reduce delays. To address varying infra-
structure fees as a non-negotiable part of operational costs, 
the study controls for districts with different levels of in-
frastructure fees.
IV. Study Design
The preparatory work pictured in Section III makes 
it possible to establish a ranking of the 28 PRTAs with 
regard to their performance on each of the six variables. 
This could be done via six different rankings but not via 
one total score ranking since the variables are about to 
measure very different things. Therefore, the study refrains 
from establishing single score rankings and instead applies 
regression and matching methods. This procedure makes 
it possible to analyse the causes of diverging performance 
patterns.
It is clear that PRTA design is not the only explanatory 
variable for every performance indicator. Socio-geographic 
differences among the PRTA territories also play a role, 
as well as the amount of money available for a PRTA. An 
exploratory process to detect other possible explanations of 
performance variance (that is, the covariables) led to a sin-
gle variable that covers them all: the number of inhabitants 
of a PRTA territory is the only variable that must be con-
trolled for. The number of inhabitants is highly correlated 
with other possible covariables, such as the territory size, 
the existing railway network and the funds a PRTA can 
employ for its work, provided according to the German 
Constitution (“Regionalisierungmittel”, Art. 106a GG). 
The latter correlation is no surprise since those funds are 
mainly distributed in relation to the number of inhabitants 
(Dziekan & Zistel 2018).
Based on the assumptions of this study, there are no com-
mon causes of PRTA design and performance output; that 
is, there are no confounders. PRTA design was determined 
by conjectures (see Section II), so there is no prior variable 
to this and all other circumstances of the tendering process 
or the con-tract modalities are consequences of the actions 
of PRTA, temporally after the design had been fixed. Those 
variables serve as mediators (temporally between PRTA de-
sign and performance output) and are therefore not to be 
controlled for (for a statistical explanation, see Morgan & 
Winship 2015).
V. Data and Results
Section IV allows to establish a regression of rail transport 
quality (measured by the six performance indicators) on 
PRTA design as the variable of interest and on the number 
of inhabitants as a control variable. Data for the regression 
is collected on cross-sectional basis for 2015. Sources were 
reports from PRTAs due to EU Regulation 1370/2007, 
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state budget documents, publications of the national sta-
tistical office and direct requests for data to the PRTAs 
and their umbrella organisation, the “BAG-SPNV”. In 
addition to the cross-sectional approach, it was possible 
to gather longitudinal data for Y1 and Y2, covering 1996, 
2010 and 2015. Regression, matching and the longitudi-
nal approach follow a hierarchy of methods, with regres-
sion as the main method and the two other methods pro-
viding supporting or objecting evidence.
Since the study is conducted over the whole population 
of the 28 PRTAs, statistical significance is not the main cri-
terion for quality of results here. Instead, correspondence 
in the results across methods plays the most important 
role (for further justification, see Loftus 1996 and Behnke 
2005).
Table 1 shows that the three dimensions of PRTA de-
sign each have a different impact on performance output, 
especially in terms of unambiguity across methods. Only 
the ‘degree of centralisation’ dimension has an effect that 
is concordant for all performance indicators and is positive 
throughout. It can be concluded that a more centralised 
PRTA leads to higher levels of rail transport quality on all 
indicators. Results for Y1, Y2 and Y6 are also significant at 
the 5 per cent level.
The effect of the ‘degree of autonomy’ dimension is main-
ly not concordant across methods, except for Y2 and Y5. It 
has a negative effect throughout but not a significant effect 
on either of the indicators. The effect of the dimension 
‘scope of tasks’ is concordant for Y1, Y2 and Y5 and has a 
positive effect throughout, but also a non-significant effect 
there.
VI. Discussion
The degree of centralisation proved to be the most un-
ambiguous dimension of PRTA design in this study. Note 
that ‘centralisation’ only denotes the degree of centrality 
within a federal state. Hence, it is not possible to propose 
that a single PRTA on the federal level of Germany would 
lead to higher levels of service quality as well. Further-
more, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the 
‘importance’ of one dimension relative to another since 
only the direction of effects is considered. Effect sizes are 
not meaningful here and need further standardisation in 
measurement of input and output variables in order to be 
comparable. Concerns about omitted ‘third’ variables are 
welcome and might stimulate the debate.
PRTA design does not explain the lion’s share of variance 
in performance outcomes for almost all of the indicators 
(except for Y6, documentation). For Y3 to Y5, the coeffi-
cient of determination is quite low. For Y1 and Y2, how-
ever, the design variables explain a considerable part of 
the variance. Considering the high amounts of train kilo-
metres and of taxpayers’ money that are employed here, 
explaining ‘just’ additional variance is also reasonable. 
Criticism stating that PRTA design is just the least impor-
tant element in the causal chain between state action and 
rail transport quality must acknowledge the substantial ef-
fect of centrality of design on the ‘hard facts’, namely train 
kilometres (Y1) and train stops (Y2). Admittedly, however, 
criticism seems to be accurate for the scope of tasks and the 
autonomy of a PRTA.
Is this result valuable as a policy recommendation for oth-
er PTAs? Yes it is, as long as a country follows a tendering 
model for public transport; that is, a ‘competition for the 
market’, not a ‘competition in the market’. When this pre-
condition is met, the study can serve as a guideline not 
only for PTAs dealing with short-distance passenger rail 
transport.
Table 1. Main effects
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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To what extent are rail investments desirable for tackling 
climate change?
Alain Quinet* and Julien Brunel**
Climate change has increased the opportunities to invest in rail transport. However, the impact of the shadow price of carbon 
on the socioeconomic evaluation of projects is far more pronounced for freight than for passengers. 
Public investments are not driven exclusively by maxim-
ising financial returns. A benevolent authority should also 
consider the welfare implications of its decisions, notably 
the impact on externalities. During the last few decades, 
pressure has grown on policy makers to tackle climate 
change. Rail services are relatively efficient in terms of car-
bon emissions and they can play a critical role in achieving 
climate change mitigation. In this article, we investigate 
whether rail investments are an economically desirable 
means of limiting climate change. The first section of the 
paper briefly presents the long-tradition of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) in France. The second section exhibits the 
role of climate change in the traditional CBA. The third 
section highlights the rising role of climate change in soci-
oeconomic analysis. Finally, the fourth section points out 
two factors that may counterbalance this evolution. 
I. Cost-Benefit Analysis in France
For economists, CBA is a common way of assessing the 
social desirability of a project or a public policy. In France, 
the practice of CBA has a long-standing tradition. Jules 
Dupuit, the nineteenth-century French engineer, is con-
sidered as the precursor of modern cost-benefit analysis. 
CBA is also a well-established practice for transport infra-
structure and it is mandatory for major public investments. 
From a technical point of view, CBA is based on complex 
engineering that estimates the total costs and benefits of 
an investment for the society. Of course, given the long-
term impacts of transport investments, this calculation is 
realized for a long period (N years). Moreover, it not only 
considers the market consequences of a project, but also 
internalises a broader variety of impacts. For a transport 
infrastructure, it notably considers non-monetised costs 
and benefits like time savings or environmental externali-
ties. Hence, this calculation requires a framework that sets 
the monetary value for these externalities. In France, CBA 
is regulated by a common framework, set by the govern-
ment, for every transport investment (rail investment, air-
ports, or highways).
This framework is regularly reassessed by reports commis-
sioned by the French Government. This is why there is a 
collection of reports, beginning with the reports prepared 
by Marcel Boiteux in 1994 and 2001, that establishes the 
doctrine of the French cost-benefit analysis. 
This framework has been updated by a series of themat-
ic reports focusing on discounting (Lebegue, 2005) or on 
the shadow price of carbon (A. Quinet, 2009). More re-
cently, a commission chaired by E. Quinet (2013) pur-
sued this tradition reviewing the practice of cost-benefit 
in France. Thereafter, the French Government published 
a new framework for cost-benefit analysis at https://www.
ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/evaluation-des-projets-trans-
port. In 2018, a commission chaired by Alain Quinet was 
initiated to review the shadow cost of carbon.
II. The Traditional Role of Climate Change in CBA
Historically, climate change has only had a marginal im-
pact on CBA. This is particularly true for investments in 
high-speed lines as illustrated by the economic appraisal of 
the new line between Vaudrecourt and Strasbourg (Figure 
1). This project, which has been underway since December 
2016, is the second phase of the high-speed line between 
Paris and Strasbourg. It represents 106 km of railways and 
costs €2.1 billion. The modal shift from air or car trans-
port to rail provides a benefit in term of greenhouse gases 
emissions. According to the framework in force in 2004, 
this benefit only represents 1.4 percent of the total cost of 
investment. In other words, modal shift provides a reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases emissions, but only has a marginal 
impact on CBA.
However, carbon emission reduction can have a signifi-
cant impact on CBA for investments in a certain type of 
rail services. This is notably the case for investments dedi-
cated to freight services. Figure 1 illustrates this point with 
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the project between Serqueux and Gisors. This project, 
which is estimated to cost €230 M, consists of enhancing 
and electrifying an existing regional line in Normandy (ap-
prox. 50 km). It will improve the quality of the railway for 
freight trains between Le Havre, one of the main French 
maritime ports, and the Paris region. For this project, the 
benefit in terms of greenhouse gases emissions is signifi-
cant and represents 25 percent of the cost of investment.
In conclusion, according to the traditional CBA, rail in-
vestments are generally not an efficient means of tackling 
climate change. These investments are very costly com-
pared to their return in greenhouse gases savings. The main 
socioeconomic benefit of high-speed lines is time savings. 
However, there are some exceptions; for instance, the im-
pact of climate change may be noticeable for freight pro-
jects since there are no equivalents to time savings for this 
kind of project.
III. The New Role Climate Change in CBA
During the last decades, the greater concern of the society 
for climate change has influenced the practice of CBA. It 
has notably resulted in an increasing role of climate change 
in the economic appraisal.
A. Social Discounting
Climate change has provoked intense debate over the 
right discount rate. In particular, the appropriate discount 
rate for climate change has been extensively debated by 
Stern (2008), Weitzman (2007), and Nordhaus (2007). 
This is a crucial issue for CBA because the conclusions 
of the analysis strongly depend on which discount rate is 
used. 
In France, the social discount rate during the 1980s was 
8 percent. Since the beginning of the 2000s, this value has 
been investigated by different commissions, in particular 
one chaired by Lebegue (2005). This commission con-
cluded that the social discount rate should be reassessed 
at 4 percent, which represents a significant decrease of this 
parameter. 
However, regarding the controversy over the value of the 
public discount rate, this commission did not take the side 
of those who estimate that discounting is not ethical. The 
arguments advanced by the commission were based on 
market considerations. More specifically, the value recom-
mended by Lebegue (2005) was derived from the standard 
Ramsey (1928) formula:
r = δ + γμ
where r is the social discount rate, δ  is a combination of 
pure time preference (δ = 1%), under which the future 
affects would be eliminated or severely altered, γ is the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (γ = 2%) 
and μ the economic growth rate (μ = 1.5%).
More recently, a report by E. Quinet (2013) reassessed 
the social discounting rate used for CBA. It recommend-
ed the use a constant social discount rate of 4.5 percent, 
including a risk premium (which was not the case in the 
previous rate). This rate is currently considered for public 
evaluation in France. 
B. The Shadow Cost of Carbon
Like any non-market good, the inclusion of the climate 
change in CBA supposes a monetisation of this damage. 
The recognition of this issue was progressively complet-
ed during the last two decades. Many developed countries 
have defined a social cost of carbon for CBA. In the Unit-
ed States during the 2000s, for instance, a wide range of 
values were used by governmental agencies such as the De-
partment of Transport (DOT), the Department of Energy 
(DOE) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to take into account this element in economic apprais-
al. These divergences ended in 2009 with an interagency 
process that provides an assessment of the social cost of 
carbon.
In France, a first set of value for the shadow price of car-
bon was defined by a French official guideline at the begin-
ning of the 2000s (Boiteux, 2001). Since then, this value 
has been reconsidered by a specific working group com-
missioned on this topic chaired by Alain Quinet (2009). 
This commission did not apply the standard Pigovian ap-
proach to estimate the social cost of carbon (that is, the 
present value damages of the marginal emission). Instead, 
it applied an alternative method, also known as the cost-ef-
fectiveness method, in which the shadow price of carbon is 
set on the basis of exogenously determined emission reduc-
tion objectives, namely carbon neutrality. In this approach, 
the shadow price of carbon is the value of carbon that is 
Figure 1. Climate change benefits
Source: Authors’ own compilation (using the CBA 
framework of 2004) 
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necessary to introduce in order to achieve the emission re-
duction objective. 
Given the French objectives in terms of CO2 reduction, 
the commission chaired by Alain Quinet (2009) recom-
mended considering a social value of carbon of €100 2008/
tCO2 in 2030. A new commission, also chaired by Alain 
Quinet, is currently reviewing this value after the 2015 
Paris Climate Agreement. According to this Commission, 
the shadow price of carbon should increase significantly 
(€250/tCO2 in 2030).
C. The Optimal Path of the Cost of Carbon
Climate change also raises questions about the evolution 
of the social cost of carbon in the long-term. Indeed, in the 
CBA, the effect of discounting may offset the evolution of 
the social cost of carbon.
The literature has offered different contributions on this 
issue recently. One of its propositions is to extend a sem-
inal model developed by Hotelling, which states that the 
optimal evolution of a nonrenewable resource is the dis-
count rate. This was a notable conclusion of the commis-
sion chaired by Alain Quinet (2009) devoted to the shad-
ow price of carbon. 
Thus, greenhouses gases emissions can be treated as a 
non-renewal resource. The objective of Paris agreement is 
‘to hold the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels’. A greenhouses 
gases concentration level can be defined in order to corre-
spond to this objective, and greenhouses gases emissions 
forbidden above this level. Therefore, the optimal rule for 
carbon emissions is the application of Hotelling principle: 
the percentage change of the social cost carbon should 
equal the discount rate. This practice has been institution-
alised for CBA in France. 
D. The Assessment Period
CBA was traditionally performed for a limited time peri-
od. An infrastructure investment was generally assessed for 
a period of 30 or 50 years. The benefits for the collectivity 
upon this period were not considered. With the increas-
ing sensibility of society over the issue of greenhouse gases 
emissions, which are a long-term pollution, several authors 
have suggested that we should adapt CBA and value the 
long-term effects of policies and investments. 
In this context, the French guideline for CBA has been 
recently adapted. The commission chaired by E. Quinet 
(2013) suggested enlarging the period of assessment. It 
proposes calculating the costs and benefits until 2070 and, 
upon this date, valuing a residual value of the investment, 
which corresponds to the net present value of benefits for 
the next 70 years; that is, until 2140. In order to be con-
sistent with the Hotelling rule, this residual value should 
be calculated stabilising the unit price of all costs and bene-
fits while the social cost of carbon will continue to increase 
like the discount rate. 
E. Application
During the last decade, socioeconomic methods have 
been adapted significantly in order to increase the role 
of carbon emissions in CBA. With this new framework, 
climate change represents has a non-negligible impact for 
CBA (Figure 2). For instance, the reduction of greenhouse 
gases can represent 50 percent of the total cost of high-
Figure 2. Evolution of socioeconomic methods
Source: Authors’ own compilation
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speed rail investment or 800 percent of the cost of a freight 
investment (Figure 3).
IV. New Issues
The above can lead to the conclusion that rail investments 
are very desirable in order to achieve carbon neutrality. 
However, such a conclusion may be fallacious. The oppor-
tunity of rail investment is counterbalanced by two issues: 
the inclusion of construction phase emissions and the evo-
lution of emission factors. 
Firstly, a series of studies recently highlighted that the 
construction of a new high-speed line is responsible for 
massive CO2 emissions. In certain circumstances (such as 
large tunnel sections and low traffic sections), these emis-
sions may offset the reduction of emissions provided by 
modal shift. For CBA, it suggests that we should also take 
into consideration the construction phase emissions, which 
have often been ignored until now. There was no rationale 
for this practice except that environmental issues were not 
monetised in CBA or their value was very low. Nowadays, 
this is no longer the case. Environmental externalities are 
not negligible, so it is essential to value their cost during 
both the operation phase and the construction phase. 
Secondly, the objective of a strong reduction of CO2 
emissions questions the reference scenario of the CBA. In 
accordance with the Paris Agreement, France aims to cut 
off its greenhouses gas emissions by achieving carbon-neu-
trality in 2050. In this context, the sector of transport will 
have to change drastically. The road transport, aviation, 
and maritime industries will have to significantly reduce 
their contributions to climate change. For instance, the 
generalization of electric vehicles can reduce the environ-
mental footprint of road transport.
This yields to a relatively counter-intuitive conclusion 
for socioeconomic analysis. Public transport would have 
no advantage in terms of CO2 emissions relative to pri-
vate decarbonised cars. Therefore, carbon neutrality would 
reduce the opportunity to invest in low-carbon infrastruc-
tures. Figure 4 presents the result of CBA assuming that 
road transport reaches carbon neutrality in 2050. In these 
circumstances, the impact of modal shift in terms of CO2 
emissions reduction is less obvious. Hence, investing in rail 
transport is less desirable.
V. Conclusion
Ultimately, this analysis suggests that rail investments 
are not necessarily an efficient means of tackling climate 
change, notably if road transport is decarbonised. 
However, one should note that there is considerable 
uncertainty when looking at long-term emission factors. 
The evolution of dirty modes of emission factors is very 
uncertain. Replacing fossil fuels by decarbonised energy 
is challenging, notably for aviation or maritime trans-
port. This complexity stresses out the importance of the 
reference scenario for CBA. Traditionally, this was been a 
critical topic because of the impact on CBA of the macroe-
conomic context (prices, GDP). With climate change, the 
evolution of emission factors becomes a critical issue of the 
reference scenario. 
Moreover, we should also point out that rail investments 
may be an efficient policy for certain services. It is likely 
that time savings remain the principal advantage of CBA 
for high-speed investments. However, rail investment can 
play a role in tackling climate change for certain services, 
such as freight transport. For these services, the decarboni-
sation of alternative modes (such as maritime transport) is 
less obvious. Therefore, rail investment may be an efficient 
means of reducing the impact of freight transport on cli-
mate change. This notably includes several enhancement 
investments on the existing network that are much more 
environmentally friendly in the construction phase than a 
new line.
Figure 3. Climate change benefits 
Source: Authors’ own compilation (using the CBA 
framework of 2018)
Figure 4. Climate change benefits (in a carbon-neutral 
society)
Source: Authors’ own compilation 
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How does liberalisation affect cross-border passenger rail in 
Central Europe?
Anja Schmotz*
This paper presents a research project that is to explore the shortcomings of cross-border passenger rail from an institutionalist 
perspective. As a first insight, the different national interpretations of the “Public Service Obligation Regulation” are 
considered as potentially problematic.
Among the European Union’s main objectives is the idea of territorial cohesion and the abolition of separating effects of state borders. When it comes 
to passenger rail, the quantity and quality of cross-bor-
der services are mostly poor compared to the same kind 
of services within most nation states. As Lüttmerding and 
Gather (2013) have shown, the quality of rail transport 
connecting metropolises in two different countries displays 
several shortcomings compared to inland services. In many 
cases, the number of regular daily connections across bor-
ders was inferior to internal traffic between metropolises. 
The average speed often was lower, and, to a certain extent, 
the number of necessary changes of trains was higher when 
a state border was crossed on a trip between European me-
tropolises. 
A recent working paper directed by the directorate-gen-
eral for regional policy confirmed that “in most border ar-
eas stations across the border are less well connected and 
trips to these stations tend to be less frequent and slower” 
(COM 2017: 2). On average, only “44 % of the popula-
tion of all border areas has access to rail services”, not nec-
essarily including cross-border services (COM 2017: 3). 
The full picture is more heterogeneous: there are also ex-
amples of efficient and frequent cross-border transport ser-
vices, for instance between Denmark and Sweden or gen-
erally in more densely populated regions (cf. COM 2017). 
However, notably in the Central Eastern and Southern 
European Member States, rail connections depict “very 
low frequencies”, making them “hardly usable for regular 
cross-border travelling” (COM 2017: 7). 
Accessibility of regional centres and metropolises in 
Central Europe
This paper focuses on cross-border passenger rail in Cen-
tral Europe, choosing German−Polish as well as German−
Czech rail connections as regional case studies. Since the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, long-distance cross-border rail in 
these two case regions has gradually been cut down, even 
though both Poland and the Czech Republic joined the 
EU in 2004. During the last few decades, regional centres 
such as Plzeň, Wrocław, Poznań, Szczecin, Dresden and the 
capital cities of Prague and Berlin have grown, giving rise 
to cross-border flows not only of tourists but also business 
travellers and work commuters (cf. Knippschild, Schmotz 
and Wätzig 2014). Nevertheless, the direct rail connection 
between Nuremberg and Prague was first shifted from 
long-distance to regional trains on the German side in 
2006 and then cancelled in 2012. The trip now requires 
at least one change of trains. The EuroCity Wawel linking 
Berlin and Wrocław was withdrawn in December 2014 
and the direct regional train from Dresden to Wrocław 
was temporarily cancelled in 2015 for nine months. Most 
of the currently existing cross-border connections between 
larger regional centres that were traditionally served by 
long-distance rail are now served by regional trains only. 
The regional replacement services mostly do not provide 
adequate rolling stock and services often suffer from both 
low frequencies and average travel speed.
Research on cross-border rail
For several years, little scientific research was conducted 
on the specific challenges of cross-border railway services. 
A recent study on ‘missing links’ concerning cross-border 
railway connections was commissioned by the European 
Commission. One of its major findings was that “[g]aps in 
the cross-border passenger rail network are not necessarily 
caused by missing elements of infrastructure: In many cas-
es, even on operational railway infrastructure there is a lack 
of cross-border passenger services” (COM 2018: 6). While 
the state of the infrastructure and the availability of rolling 
stock may play an important role, this finding showed that 
there is a scope for action within the landscape of actors 
(public authorities, regulatory bodies, and rail operators) 
to improve the level of services.
However, there have still not been any scientific studies 
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showing how these different barriers, institutional 
structures, and technical aspects interact, contributing to 
the low quality of cross-border passenger rail services. This 
underway thesis will provide such a study, analysing the 
current offer in cross-border rail services as a product of the 
multi-level governance regime created by the EU Single 
(Railway) Market policy and national railway reforms. The 
focus is on German−Polish and German−Czech passenger 
rail, allowing for an in-depth, qualitative analysis.
Approach and methodology
The main research questions of this ongoing project are:
• Which mechanisms can explain the current 
shortcomings regarding the quality and quantity of 
cross-border passenger rail offers? 
• To what extent can this be attributed to European 
and national rules introduced during the process of 
railway liberalisation?
The project aims (a) to show if and which mismatches 
have grown out of the specific national ways to implement 
European railway regulation, and (b) to clarify if there is 
a need to adapt the national and the European regulato-
ry regimes to provide suitable policy instruments to foster 
cross-border rail services.
Existing work displays an effect of the state of the in-
frastructure, the availability of adequate rolling stock, as 
well as the competition with street and air transport on the 
provision of passenger rail services. Research needs to be 
done, not merely on the relevance of single variables, but 
the causal mechanisms linking these variables. 
Within this project, institutional analyses of the German, 
Czech, and Polish railway systems are realised, followed 
by case studies of cross-border railway connections. At 
the current stage of research, three groups of connections 
between metropolises and regional centres can be distin-
guished:
1) Present-day long-distance services that expose a 
continuity of offers and are situated on the main 
TEN-T corridors (such as Berlin–Warsaw and Ber-
lin–Prague). 
2) Train connections between important regional cen-
tres that have previously been operated as long-dis-
tance services, but, after experiencing a retreat of the 
leading long-distance operators in the region, are 
now being served as regional transport only (“poten-
tial long-distance services” such as Berlin–Wrocław, 
Dresden–Wrocław, Berlin– Szczecin, Nuremberg–
Prague, and Munich–Prague). 
3) Cross-border connections linking smaller centres 
(such as Görlitz–Jelenia Góra) clearly defined as 
regional services and recompensed as public service 
obligations. 
The second group of cases is particularly interesting be-
cause it shows most clearly the effects of liberalisation and 
railway reforms on cross-border connections. These con-
nections are at the centre of the different national interpre-
tations of what a public service obligation comprises and 
how and by whom it can be organised and financed. Thus, 
the focus of the case studies will be on this group, while the 
others are used for comparison purposes. 
For the chosen cases of potential long-distance connec-
tions, I will study whether comparable arrangements lead 
to a similar outcome for both German−Polish and Ger-
man−Czech rail connections and if common denomina-
tors can be found. There is evidence of German−Czech 
connections performing slightly better than German−Pol-
ish services from the same group, especially regarding the 
number of pairs of trains per day, features of the rolling 
stock, and the organisation of through connections. If this 
can be confirmed during the data analysis, a case study 
will check which variables and mechanisms make the dif-
ference. 
The gathering of data for the institutional analysis is 
based on pieces of European, national and regional leg-
islation. If necessary, additional expert interviews will be 
conducted. In the second phase, the case study is mainly 
built on interviews with actors and experts. The develop-
ment of cross-border connections over time is treated in a 
separate analysis based on timetables and statistical data. 
The following sections present insight into the institution-
al analysis.
Liberalisation transforming the field of actors and 
rules of the game
The EU’s market opening policy had a profound impact 
on the rail sector. The so-called ‘unbundling’, starting with 
the Directive 91/440/EEC, strongly changed the land-
scape of actors, but it still allowed for a broad range of 
structures to be implemented in the Member States.
Further essential steps for creating a Single European 
Railway Area were taken from 2001 on, when the first of 
currently four ‘railway packages’ was adopted. New actors 
entered the stage with the establishment of regulatory bod-
ies monitoring market and safety issues. Access rights of 
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railway operators to the infrastructure were subsequent-
ly extended, from open access in international passenger 
transport, including cabotage, effective since 2010, to na-
tional passenger transport entering into force in 2019/20. 
For cross-border public transport services, Regulation 
(EC) 1370/2007 is particularly relevant. This so-called 
“Public Service Obligation (PSO) Regulation” sets the 
framework for the provision of public transport services 
of general interest. It requires public service contracts to 
be concluded by a competent authority when an operator 
is granted an exclusive right and/or compensation for the 
discharge of public service obligations (Art. 3). Amended 
by Regulation (EU) 2016/2338, the PSO Regulation now 
foresees, as a general rule, that public service contracts in 
transport shall be awarded by competitive tendering, in 
case they are not to be concluded with an internal opera-
tor. This regulation shall apply to public passenger rail ser-
vices from December 2019 onwards, given a transition pe-
riod until 2023. In sum, this regulation defines important 
procedural rules for the provision of a part of passenger rail 
services that each Member State must follow. However, it 
leaves a major scope of action, as will be illustrated in the 
next section.
Adapting national law to the PSO Regulation in Ger-
many, Poland, and the Czech Republic
Concerning the definition of public service obligations, 
there is a significant difference between Germany on one 
side and Poland and the Czech Republic on the other. The 
two latter countries consider regional, interregional, and 
long-distance transport to be of general interest. The Polish 
Act on Public Transport, effective since March 2011, pro-
vides that the ministry in charge of transport is responsible 
for interregional and international public transport lines 
(Art. 7.1 (6)). To date, the ministry awards PSO contracts 
directly “to the operator of its choice, i.e. PKP Intercity” 
(CER 2017: 111), the long-distance branch of the state-
owned holding Polskie Koleje Państwowe.
In the Czech Republic, the Act on Public Service in Pas-
senger Transport 194/2010 and amendments of other 
Acts adopted in April 2010 provide an assignment of tasks 
comparable to that in Poland, with the Ministry of Trans-
port being directly responsible for determining the scope 
of long-distance and interregional public transport.
In contrast, current German legislation draws a line be-
tween the category of long-distance transport being a pure-
ly commercial service and (inter)regional passenger rail 
services. The Constitution (Grundgesetz) stipulates in Art. 
87e(4) that the Federal State guarantees that the public 
good will be considered concerning rail transport services 
provided by the state-run railway companies, not pertain-
ing to local or regional traffic. As of yet there is no legal 
act specifying the role of long-distance transport. Only the 
Federal Act on the Regionalisation of Local and Regional 
Passenger Transport, effective since 1996, postulates that 
“guaranteeing a sufficient service of local and regional pub-
lic transport to the public is a task of general interest (Da-
seinsvorsorge)” (§ 1 (1), own translation). Public local and 
regional transport is defined as regular, universally accessi-
ble passenger transport “predominantly intended to satisfy 
the demand in urban, suburban and regional transport.” As 
a point of reference, the law specifies a maximum distance 
of 50 km or travel time of no longer than one hour. (Cf. 
§ 2) According to this act, the competent authorities are 
to be designated by the law of the federal states (Länder).
Therefore, the provision of long-distance rail services in 
Germany is a genuinely commercial decision of each op-
erator. Given the current market structure, mainly the in-
cumbent Deutsche Bahn Fernverkehr determines if service 
on a long-distance connection is profitable and therefore 
worth being provided. On the other hand, in Poland and 
the Czech Republic, the respective ministries responsible 
for transport decide which long-distance services shall be 
provided as public services, mainly taking the form of di-
rect awards to the state-owned railway companies PKP and 
ČD. Still, these awards allow for additional commercial 
services to be delivered by railway operators within open 
access procedures (such as LEO Express and RegioJet in 
the Czech Republic). In Germany, the governance mode 
market prevails, but the incumbent is confronted with lit-
tle competition; in the other two cases, both market and 
hierarchical modes play a role in long-distance rail services, 
with a somehow more vivid competition in the Czech Re-
public than in Poland.
For regional passenger rail, the variance is not only found 
on the national level, but also between regions. In Germa-
ny, the Länder adjacent to Poland and the Czech Republic 
chose different models. For instance, Bavaria, as well as a 
union of Berlin and Brandenburg, each established a sin-
gle regional authority covering the whole territory, whereas 
Saxony has delegated the competence to order regional rail 
passenger services to five distinct dedicated associations 
(Zweckverbände) in the hands of the rural districts (Land-
kreise). The procedure applied in nearly all cases is a com-
petitive tendering of public services.
In the Czech Republic, the competence for local and re-
gional public transport lies with the regions (kraje). Some 
of the regions established distinct bodies, for instance, to 
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coordinate timetables. PSO contracts are concluded by ei-
ther direct award or competitive tendering.
In Poland, according to the Act on Railway Transport and 
the Act on Public Transport, the competent contracting 
authorities for regional public transport services are the 
self-governments of the voivodeships (województwa). The 
voivodeships either apply competitive tendering or opt for 
direct negotiations with a single operator to award PSO 
contracts. A particularity of the Polish system is that most 
railway undertakings operating regional services are owned 
by the voivodeships themselves. 
Conclusion and future work
Member States make use of the scope provided by the 
PSO Regulation in different ways, and the structures, pro-
cedures, and definitions of what can be counted as public 
service vary greatly from one country to another. The con-
frontation of different governance modes that do not nec-
essarily fit one another is likely to provoke deficiencies in 
service provision. Mainly German long-distance passenger 
rail services are operated at the economic risk of the oper-
ating railway company. This operation without subsidies 
bears the risk of neglecting connections on which passen-
ger demand is too low to be profitable. Future work within 
this PhD project includes the investigation of what deters 
Polish and Czech state-owned long-distance operators or 
other railway undertakings from offering such cross-border 
services on their own, and if there is a need to provide spe-
cific policy tools to foster long-distance services. 
Concerning regional public rail services, it will be exam-
ined whether the different awarding procedures prevail-
ing in each region tend to be compatible or incompatible 
with each other. Between Germany and, respectively, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, joint procedures for compet-
itive tendering currently are rarely applied. Studies should 
examine how the dissimilarity of regional institutional 
structures impacts on the cooperation of the competent 
authorities. Notably, the differences regarding territorial 
coverage of the dedicated associations in Saxony compared 
to those in Bavaria and Berlin/ Brandenburg might have 
effects on their ability to negotiate with partners from the 
neighbouring country.
This paper only provides a rough outline of the govern-
ance regime concerning cross-border railways between 
Germany and its Eastern neighbours. When completed, 
the study will allow answers to the question if the policy 
instruments currently provided by the EU and its Member 
States are suitable to improve cross-border rail transport.
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8th Conference on the Regulation of 
Infrastructures. Digital Platforms – The New 
Network Industries? How to regulate them?
20 June 2019 - 21 June 2019
The Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures is the annual event that brings together all the Areas of the Florence 
School of Regulation. This 8th  edition aims to identify the key challenges of digitalisation for traditional network 
industries; discover various regulatory approaches to platforms and determine benefit scenarios for consumers and 
to the platforms itself. 
The conference is intended for academics such as PhD students, PostDocs and Assistant/associate/full 
Professors as well as academically minded practitioners.
For additional information, please, contact us at fsr.transport@eui.eu
5th Florence Intermodal Forum. 
Internalising the External Costs of Transport
20 May 2019
Following the usual approach of the Florence School of Regulation, stakeholders and academics will join the 5th 
Florence Intermodal Forum to examine the significant external costs of transport, and reflect on the necessary 
policy tools to internalise these. The discussion will be based on a new study “Sustainable Transport Infrastructure 
Charging and Internalisation of Transport Externalities”.
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Network Industries Quarterly, 
Vol. 21, issue 2, 2019 (June)
Current Issues in the Network Industries in Turkey
In Turkey, following the economic crisis in 2001, comprehensive market-based reforms were 
launched in several sectors, including the network industries, such as telecommunications, elec-
tricity, and airline. The privatisation of certain units has enabled the stimulation of investments in 
different segments and the establishment of sector-specific regulatory authorities, which in turn 
have resulted in significant improvements. 
However, the introduction of competition and regulatory achievements in the electricity and 
the telecommunications industries, have been slower than initially anticipated. Excessive infra-
structural investments have created uncertainty about the future of the airline industry. Moreover, 
emerging platforms on the internet are witnessing problematic regulatory interventions.
The next issue of the Network Industries Quarterly will be dedicated to papers related to these 
current issues observed across the network industries in Turkey. Academics and practitioners will 
discuss the aforementioned developments in the electricity, telecommunications, airline, and 
platform industries.
Guest editor: Dr. Emin Köksal
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Bahcesehir University, Turkey
The guest editor of this issue is Dr. Emin Köksal (B.A. & M. A.: Galatasaray University, Ph.D.: 
Marmara University). He published extensively on competition and regulatory issues in telecom-
munications, energy, and in platform industries. Dr. Köksal has experience in platform business 
models, network neutrality regulations and internet usage. He teaches industrial organisation, 
platform economics, innovation & competition policy in digital markets.
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
The Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
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